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‘They’re all weak, all women. They’re stupid compared to men. They shouldn’t
play chess, you know. They’re like beginners. They lose every single game against a
man. There isn’t a woman player in the world I can’t give knight-odds to and still
beat.’ Bobby Fischer, 1962, Harper’s Magazine
‘Chess is a mixture of sport, psychological warfare, science, and art. When you look
at all these components, man dominates. Every single component of chess belongs
to the areas of male domination.’ Garry Kasparov, 2003, The Times of London
‘Girls just don’t have the brains to play chess.’ Nigel Short, 2015, The Telegraph
1 Introduction
Despite extensive research, debate and policy interventions, gender differences in labor market
outcomes persist. The unconditional gender wage gap is about 18% in OECD countries. Only
1 in 7 board members in European and US companies are women. Three traditional explana-
tions for this phenomenon are discrimination, differences in ability and differences in preferences
for jobs (Polachek, 1981; Goldin and Rouse, 2000; Black and Strahan, 2001). More recently,
a growing interest has developed around a fourth explanation: Gender differences in compet-
itiveness (see Niederle and Vesterlund (2011) for an excellent survey). The existing evidence
suggests that women perform worse than men of the same ability in competitive environments
(Gneezy, Niederle, and Rustichini, 2003), which may lead women to ‘shy away from competition’
(Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Given that good management practice dictates that managers
ought to create competitive environments to increase productivity (Bloom, Propper, Seiler and
Van Reenen, 2015), gender differences in competitiveness might help to explain the persistent
gender differences in wages and the under-representation of women in high-powered jobs.
The majority of studies on gender and competition confine themselves to experiments both
in the lab and in the field. In general, results in this literature suggest that women are more
reluctant to enter into a competition, even when they are no less able than men (Vandegrift
and Brown 2005; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Gupta, Poulsen, and Villeval, 2013), and that
women may be less responsive to competition than men (e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004).
Any such differences seem to be social rather than innate (Gneezy, Leonard and List, 2009).
However, as Croson and Gneezy (2009) point out, many unanswered questions remain, including
the effect of gender composition on gender differences on competitive performance.
In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature on gender and competition by studying
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a natural setting. We employ data from tens of thousands of expert chess games played by highly
skilled and dedicated players. Our first finding is that female players obtain worse outcomes
than male players of the same ability. Second, we show that this performance gender-gap is
due to the gender composition of the match: two players of identical ability perform similarly
in single gender games, whereas female players obtain worse outcomes than male players of the
same ability in mixed gender games. We then move to the study of the mechanisms behind this
effect. We use the method developed by Guid and Bratko (2006, 2011) to compute the quality
of play of each player in each game they play. This differs from measures of ability based on
win-loss records, as it allows us to measure how well a player plays during a particular game. We
find that the effect of the gender composition of the game on the underperformance of women
is driven largely by female players making larger errors when playing against males. This is in
contrast with male players, who play equally well regardless of the sex of the opponent. We
also find that, on average, men persist longer before resigning when playing against a woman,
decreasing the points that a female player can expect to earn against a male opponent. These
results suggest that inter-gender competition changes the behaviour of both men and women
in ways that are detrimental to the performance of women. Lastly, we study the existence
of gender differences in response to increased competitive pressure. We find that the quality
of play diminishes in games with higher stakes, though we do not find compelling evidence of
heterogeneity in this effect over the gender composition of games.
Chess is an ideal testbed for the study of gender differences in competitiveness for a number
of reasons. First, it is one of the few sports, if not the only one, in which male and female
players engage in head-to-head competition against one another. Second, as chess is ultimately
a computational problem, performance is almost exclusively a function of effort and ability. Un-
like in other games, say, poker, luck plays virtually no role. Third, there exists a standard and
well-established metric of players’ ability, the Elo rating (discussed in detail below), allowing
us to control for the relative abilities of the competitors. These ratings are publicly observable.
Consequently, players have a very good sense of where they stand relative to their opponent at
the start of the game. Thus we can largely rule out one of the main explanations for gender
differences in competitiveness, namely, gender differences in overconfidence (Niederle and Vester-
lund, 2011). Finally, our data has records of every move in each game, not just its outcome, so
we can observe the choices made by players and the circumstances in which those choices are
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made. As chess is a computational exercise (discussed below), we can objectively assess players’
quality of play by comparing their chosen moves with the preferred move of a powerful chess
engine.1 For most competitive environments, sports or otherwise, such counterfactuals cannot
be calculated.
Expert chess is relevant to the study of gender because it shares several important features
with high-powered jobs and competitive professional settings. First, like board rooms, expert
chess is a domain in where women are severely under-represented. Women constitute only about
eleven percent of mixed-sex tournament players and two percent of Grandmasters. Second, as
the opening quotes demonstrate, negative stereotyping against females is pervasive in high level
chess as it is in professional settings (Auster and Prasad, 2016). Third, female players in
chess underperform their male counterparts. The average female player has a rating that is
15 percent lower than the average male player (Blalic, Smallbone, McLeod and Gobet, 2009).
There is currently (August 2016) only one woman, Hou Yifan, ranked among the top 100 players
and there has never been a female world-champion. This performance gap echoes the gender
wage gap that persists even after controlling for potential confounders (Blau and Kahn, 2016)
because there is no compelling evidence showing that men are innately superior chess players,
as we discuss below. Lastly, top chess players, be they male or female, are individuals with high
levels of cognition, determination, tenacity and dedication. Expert female players, like women
in highly competitive professional environments, have selected into a male-dominated and very
demanding environment. Given this selection, one might think it unlikely that we observe any
gender differences in performance. However, we do. The fact that we observe gender differences
among this very select group of people suggests that vulnerability to such gender effects should
be prevalent, and probably stronger, in wider domains.
In the next section we discuss the literature which has studied gender differences in com-
petitiveness in real settings and in chess in particular. In Section 3 we present the data. In
Section 4 we present our main result and determine that, after controlling for ability, age and
other factors, players’ performance is affected by the gender of the opponent. In Section 5, we
discuss the mechanisms behind this result. Section 6 concludes.
1 As a matter of fact, during competitions, commentators already employ computers to learn which next move
is a player’s best and can recognize mistakes almost immediately. See “How computers changed chess”, The
Conversation, May 2013. Available at https://theconversation.com/how-computers-changed-chess-20772
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2 Related Literature
Competition in the field
The majority of studies on gender differences in competitiveness confine themselves to labo-
ratory and field experiments. Gneezy et al. (2003) conducted a laboratory experiment where
subjects had to solve mazes on the Internet. They found that women performed worse than men
when the payment scheme was competitive but not under piece-rate compensation. Gneezy and
Rustichini (2004) confirmed this finding for Israeli children in running competitions. In these rel-
atively artificial setups, the perceived gender-bias of the task plays an important role. Günther,
Ekinci, Schwieren, and Strobel (2010) find that females perform better than males when the task
is perceived as female-biased. Along similar lines, Shurchkov (2012) finds that females overtake
men when performing a verbal task under low-time pressure. Iriberri and Rey-Biel (2016) show
that omitting information about the gender of the opponent helps to mitigate the underperfor-
mance of women in competition, indicating that part of the problem is who women compete
against, not simply that they compete at all. Although clearly valuable for their ability to con-
trol confounding factors, these experiments are far removed from real interactions between men
and women and from real competitive stakes. The question that remains is whether differences
in competitiveness observed in experiments persist in real settings.
Only a handful of contributions have addressed gender differences in competitiveness in
natural settings, in part due to the difficulty of finding appropriate conditions (e.g. observable
ability, men and women competing on equal footing). One exception is educational competitions,
and admissions to selective programs in particular, where men and women compete in an equal
footing. This permits the study of differential responses to varying degrees of competition. Örs,
Palomino and Peyrache (2013) compare the results of the same group of male and female students
in a less competitive high school national exam and in a very competitive exam for entry into
a selective French business school. The performance of female students dominates the one of
male students in the less competitive exam whereas the opposite holds in the more competitive
exam. A similar picture emerges from the study by Morin (2015), who takes advantage of an
educational reform in Ottawa which shortened high school by one year. This meant that two
cohorts of students graduated in the same year thus increasing competition for university places.
Morin finds that the average grades and graduation rates of male students increased relative to
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those of females. But gender effects do not always appear in competitive environments. For
example, Lavy (2013) studies the behavior of Israeli teachers who participated in rank-order
tournaments that rewarded them with cash bonuses based on the tests scores of their classes.
Teachers were competing with others within their field and school. Male and female teachers
did not respond differently to this new payment scheme.
While informative about how men and women respond to competition, these studies do not,
however, tell us whether it is competing that hurts women’s performance or competing against
men. This question is addressed in Antonovics, Arcidiacono and Walsh (2009), who use data
from the TV trivia show The Weakest Link. In the final round of the show, two players compete
against each other. The authors find that male contestants are more likely to answer a question
correctly when they face a female contestant than when they face another male. The gender of
the opponent does not influence the performance of female contestants. This is in contrast with
our finding of female players making larger errors when facing a male opponent.
Chess
Chess has been studied by psychologists for years because it involves high order cognition (see
Charness (1992) for an early survey). Chess has also become a recent object of interest for
economists. The cognitive power of expert chess players, combined with the computational
nature of the game, makes chess a natural candidate for the study of strategic sophistication
(Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2009; Levitt, List and Saddoff, 2011). More closely related to
our analysis, Gerdes and Gränsmark (2010) explore gender differences in risk behaviour by
using chess data. They measure risk according to whether the opening moves of a game are
deemed ‘aggressive’ or ‘solid’ by a number of expert chess players. They associate ‘aggressive’
openings with risk taking. They find that females are on average two percent less likely to use
an ‘aggressive’ opening than male players. Males are more likely to use ‘aggressive’ openings
when playing against females. Females also have a tendency to use more ‘aggressive’ openings
against females but only against female players with higher rating than themselves. However,
the authors also find that ‘aggressiveness’ reduces the probability of winning regardless of the
gender of the opponent. This finding ultimately falls short to explain the gender performance
gap in chess.
Gränsmark (2012) explores gender differences in time preferences. Again using survey data
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on expert chess players, he finds that males play shorter games on average and that they are
willing to pay a higher price to end the game sooner by arranging a draw. Hence, Gränsmark
(2012) concludes that males are more impatient than women. We return to the issue of game
length in our analysis below.
Two papers have specifically explored the response of female chess players to the gender of
the opponent. Using online games, Maas, D’ettole and Cadinu (2008) find no gender differences
in outcomes when the sex of the opponent remains unknown. Compared to that benchmark,
women perform more poorly when they know they are playing against a male opponent. When
they falsely believe to be playing against a woman, gender differences disappear again. They use
data from “rapid” chess games (15 minutes long) and they do not control for the Elo rating of the
participants. Rothgerber and Wolsiefer (2014) use field data and find that females underperform
when playing against a male opponent. They again use short games (30 minutes) played by
elementary, middle and high school students. Although they have information on students’ pre-
and post-game ratings, their ability measure is not as reliable as the Elo rating.
The closest paper to ours is the recent working paper from de Sousa and Hollard (2015)
who also look at the effect of inter-gender competition using data from chess tournaments. It is
reassuring that they find a gender effect as we do; women perform worse when playing against
male opponents. They go on to consider whether the effect diminishes with experience (only
very slightly) and with the Gender Gap Index of the player’s home country (not at all). Though
their data set is considerably larger than ours in terms of the number of games, they do not
study the mechanisms underlying the observed gender effect nor do they employ a within game
quality of play measure as we do. They are therefore relatively limited in how far they can study
the mechanisms underlying the estimated effect, the central focus of our paper. Moreover, they
do not address the issue of the (conditionally) random assignment of the opponent’s gender
whereas we confront the issue of identification directly. We are also the first ones to characterize
the bias caused by the measurement error in Elo ratings arising from the observed gender effect.
In addition, we study gender differences in the effect on performance of competitive pressure as
measured by the stakes of games.
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3 Data
Chess players are rigorous data collectors who systematically codify information on games played
in tournaments and share it in publicly available archives. They collect a great deal of game
information: date of the game, event at which it was played, all moves made, the color (white
or black) each player plays with, the players involved, the outcomes, the FIDE2 registration
number of each player, which allows us to link the game data to information on their gender,
age and affiliated national federation, and the ability of each player at the start of each game
as measured by the Elo rating. Game data are generally stored in Portable Game Notation
(PGN) files which can be read by chess programs allowing players to review how a particular
game unfolded.
We take our data from the weekly publication “The Week in Chess” (TWIC). Every Monday,
TWIC publishes game data from the largest and most notable tournaments from around the
world. We use the PGN files published by TWIC for 2012 and the first six months of 2013 giving
us information from 79,242 games played by 14,056 players from 154 national federations.3
Our data set is constructed by randomly selecting a player from each game (white or black).
The selected player is our unit of observation, i or the ‘player’, and we denote the other person
as the ‘opponent’. Arranging the data in this way means we construct a panel of player i over
games g. We can thus control for player i fixed effects to consider the effect of within i variation
in game conditions, including the gender of i’s opponent, on i’s performance.
We restrict our sample in a number of ways. Following Gränsmark (2012) and Gerdes and
Gränsmark (2013), we focus on expert chess players and drop those games in which i has an
Elo rating less than 2000 (we keep games in which the opponent has an Elo less than 2000,
though all our results are robust to their exclusion). Players at this level are regarded as experts
and have generally committed between 2500 and 7500 hours of alone study (excluding coaching
and group study) to achieve this level of skill (Hambrick, Oswald, Altmann, Meinz, Gobet and
Campitelli, 2014). We also drop games which lasted fewer than 15 moves as we need games
at least that long to compute our quality of play variable (details below). We also exclude
players who play only one game in our sample. Our full analytic sample is therefore comprised
2 FIDE stands for the Fédération Internationale des Échecs or World Chess Federation which is the international
governing body of chess.
3 These were the TWIC data available when we started working on this paper.
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of 57,936 games played by 7,932 players. We define a second sample by excluding those players
who only play against one gender in our sample (all male or all female opponents) reducing
our sample to 28,759 played by 2,506 players, a sub-sample of players we call ‘switchers’. We
present descriptive statistics for male and female players in both the full and restricted sample
of ‘switchers’ in Table 1.
Columns (1) and (2) are for the full sample of male and female players respectively, and
columns (3) and (4) are for the sub-sample of switchers. In our full sample, male players earn
an average of 0.53 points per game (the standard point system assigns one point for a win,
0.5 for a draw and zero for a loss) and female players earn 0.50, a differential which holds for
switchers.4 Players and opponents are about 31 years old on average, though females tend to be
a bit younger. The degree to which chess is male dominated is apparent with 87 percent of the
players in our full sample and 80 percent in our restricted sample being male. Note also that
male players are more likely than female players to face a male opponent, an important point
we return to below.
The Elo rating
The availability of the Elo ratings, created by the physicist Arpad Elo (Elo, 1978), is one of
the major advantages of using chess data. The Elo is a cardinal rating of each player’s ability
as a function of the outcome of previous games played and the difference between the player’s
own Elo rating and that of the opponent in those games. The Elo rating has a minimum score
of zero and no upper bound. For each 200 point interval from 100 to 1999 players are rated
J to A. Players with Elo ratings of 2000-2199 are classified as ‘Experts”, ‘Candidate Masters’
have ratings in excess of 2200, ‘International Masters’ ratings above 2400 and ‘Grand Masters’
have ratings larger than 2500. There are also women’s equivalent titles, though the Elo rating
thresholds are 200 points lower than for the men’s titles and some top female players have opted
not to take on such gendered titles. Very few top players have obtained ratings of over 2700.
The current world champion, Magnus Carlsen, achieved the highest Elo score ever obtained by
4 Note that the expected points for players in our sample exceeds 0.5 as we condition our sample to include
players with Elo ratings of at least 2000, while opponents may have an Elo rating below 2000.
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a human player, 2882, in 2014. Top computer chess engines have Elo scores above 3200.5
A player’s Elo rating at the end of game g can be expressed as
Eloig+1 = Eloig +K [pig − E[pig]] , (1)
where ELOig is i’s Elo rating at the start of game g, pig is the points the player obtains in
game g, and K is an adjustment parameter. Following the FIDE rules applying to our sample,
K =15 if the player has a rating lower than 2400 and K = 10 once a player achieves a rating of
2400, even if her rating falls back below that threshold.6 Finally,
E[pig] =
1
1 + 10
(
Eloo
ig
−Eloig
400
) , (2)
is the so called ‘Elo curve’, that is, the points i is expected to earn from a game against an
opponent with an Elo rating of Elooig at the start of game g. As it can be seen, Elo points
are earned (lost) by performing better (worse) in a game than the Elo curve predicts. Players
always increase their Elo rating following a win and decrease it following a loss. The effect of a
draw is positive if Eloig < Elooig, negative if Eloig > Elo
o
ig and neutral if Eloig = Elo
o
ig.
The advantage of the Elo rating is two-fold. First, regardless of the player’s subjective
assessment of her ability relative to her opponent’s, it provides an objective and publicly known
measure of that ability. Second, the Elo rating allows us to control for the relative abilities of
the two individuals competing, a feature often absent in studies of competitions where proxies
for skill generally need to be used.
The players in our sample are exceptionally good at the game. A rating of 2000, the lower
bound for players included in our sample, puts a player in the top 5 percent of all registered
FIDE players. A rating of 2350, roughly the mean for all players in our sample, puts them in
the top 0.5 percent of registered FIDE players. The mean Elo rating for male players is 2370.06
in our full sample (2342.98 for switchers), which is about 90 Elo points higher than the mean
5 Note that the ratings of computer programs (there are two well known rating lists: SSDF list (Swedish Chess
Computer Association) and the CCRL list (Computer Chess Rating Lists)) have only be computed through
games with other computer programs and as such are an estimate. The question whether those ratings are
directly comparable to the ratings of human players is debated among computer scientists and chess experts.
However, although the 3200 Elo rating of the best computer programs is indeed an estimate, it is generally
safe to assert they are much stronger than any human player.
6 By FIDE rules, K = 25 if a player has played fewer than 30 games. Given the skill of the players in our sample,
we assume all players have played more than 30 games.
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rating of women. Women’s opponents have lower average Elo ratings than men’s opponents
because players play opponents with similar Elo ratings as the majority of events have tiered
entries, i.e. they follow the so-called Swiss system. We return to this point below.
The quality of play measure
In competitive activities, rating systems are generally accepted as a way to assess the relative
skill levels of the participants. While there are numerous approaches to rating competitors (Elo
ratings being just one example), these systems tend to be based on the realized outcomes of
competitions.7 Elo is a good measure of a player’s overall ability but tells us nothing about
how well a particular game is played. This distinction is important because we want to study
whether the gender composition of a game affects how well a player plays a particular game.
Measuring within game play quality differs conceptually from studying strategic decisions.
Others (e.g. Gerdes and Gränsmark, 2010) have sought to study the relationship between gender
and strategic choices in chess focusing on the variation in the ‘aggressiveness’ of play, as defined
by expert players. However, chess is ultimately a computational problem, which is precisely
why computers excel at it.8 The game of chess is theoretically solvable (Schwable and Walker,
1999).9 That is, there is an optimal move for any given board position which can be calculated
via backward induction. Any deviation from that move, be deemed ‘aggressive’ or otherwise by
a human player, is suboptimal to some degree. How well a game is played can be objectively
determined by the deviation of a move relative to the optimal move. Therefore, we depart from
the literature that has considered more subjective, interpretive concepts such as ’style of play’
or ‘aggressive/solid move’ (how a game is played) and instead consider the quality of play (how
well a game is played).
To do so, we use a recently developed method by Guid and Bratko (2006, 2011) which
allows us to assess the quality of the move played by each player for a given board position.
The basis for this assessment is the difference between the move played by the human player
7 For a comprehensive overview of such ratings in chess see Glickman (1995).
8 As John von Neumann once noted ‘Chess is not a game. Chess is a well defined form of computation.’
(Bronowski, 1973).
9 While the chess game is in principle solvable, it has never been solved. According to Shannon (1950) a typical
game of 40 moves involves 10120 variations to be calculated from the first move. A computer calculating at
the ’rate of one variation per micro-second would require over 1090 years to calculate the first move!’.
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and the ‘optimal’ move as chosen by a powerful chess program.10 For the current paper we
use the powerful Houdini 1.5a x64 program which has a maximum Elo rating of 3126, several
hundred points above even the very best human players in history11. The Elo curve suggests
this program would defeat the average player in our sample every time they played. Following
Guid and Bratko (2006, 2011), we base our quality of play variable on the analysis of moves
n = 15, . . . , 30, in each game g with total length N moves. We then calculate 32 optimal
moves (technically they are called plies), 16 for the player and 16 for the opponent. We consider
this subset of moves for two reasons. First, to limit the substantial computational burden of
calculating so many moves (about 1.5 million in our full sample). Second, we want to focus on
the middle game, which is least likely to follow an established plan as expert players tend to
study the opening moves of their opponents and practice end games in advance. For each of
these moves, the chess program determines its preferred move given the position on the board
with a search depth of 15 moves.12 The chess engine effectively evaluates a decision tree that
extends 15 moves forward from the move in question, evaluating the best move of both the player
and the opponent at each node; this process encapsulates billions of possible board positions.13
We measure a player’s relative advantage at a point in the game using the widely accepted
metric called a centipawn. A centipawn is equal to 1/100 of a pawn.14 A player in a given
position with a score of 100 centipawns is seen as having an advantage equivalent to having an
extra pawn on the board.
The quality of each move is measured by the difference between the centipawn (dis)advantage
given the nth move made by the chess engine, Cncomputer, and the centipawn (dis)advantage given
10 We put optimal in inverted commas because the move determined by the powerful chess engine may not be
the truly optimal move for a given board position since chess has not been solved yet.
11 http://www.computerchess.org.uk/ccrl/4040/rating_list_all.html
12 While greater search depth is feasible, it rapidly increases the computational burden. In general, increasing
search depth by one move doubles the required computing time required.
13 We include a non-technical discussion of how chess engines find optimal moves in Appendix A.
14 For a given board configuration and a given chess engine configuration, the score in centipawns x can be
interpreted as follows:
x Translates as
x<-200 ⇒ Black is winning
-200≤x<-50 ⇒ Black is clearly better
-50≤x<-20 ⇒ Black is slightly better
-20≤x <20 ⇒ Approximately equal
20≤x<50 ⇒ White is slightly better
50≤x<200 ⇒ White is clearly better
200<x ⇒ White is winning
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the nth move actually made by the player, Cnplayer, with larger differences indicating a larger
error made by the player, i.e. a more poorly played move. We measure the quality of play for
each player in each game, as the mean error committed by player i for moves n = 15, . . . , 30
errorig =
∑n˜
n=15
(
Cncomputer − C
n
player
)
n˜
, (3)
where
(
Cncomputer − C
n
player
)
≥ 0 and n˜ = min{30, N} as some games end in fewer than 30
moves. We also calculate the mean error of the opponent, erroroig. Note that larger values of
errorig indicate a lower quality played game.
Guid and Bratko (2011) considered dozens of games played by world champions, finding a
mean error of about five. We consider tens of thousands of games and find a mean error of
16.5 (17.3 for opponents) in the full sample. As can be seen in Table 1, women commit larger
mean errors, as might be expected given their lower average Elo ratings. There is a statistically
significant negative correlation between a player’s Elo and the mean error (ρ = −0.18, p-value<
0.000) suggesting better players make smaller mean errors.
4 Analysis and results
Gender and performance
We first consider whether a player’s gender plays a role in determining the outcomes of chess
games. To do so, we regress the points earned from a game (one for a win, 0.5 for a draw, zero
for a loss) on the player’s gender -the effect of interest- while controlling for E[pig] as defined in
equation (2) to capture the difference in ability between the player and the opponent. We also
include the age of each player and the color that i plays (white or black) as control variables.
We estimate the model using OLS on pooled data and present results in Table 2.
In column (1), we use the full sample and in column (2) we use the sub-sample of switchers.
Female players earn about 0.01 fewer points, on average and ceteris paribus, than their male
counterparts. This simple result based on pooled data is consistent with much of the literature
in this area which finds that women underperform men in competitive environments. This
underperformance does not, however, seem to be simply a function of a player being female,
nor can we deduce from this result that women are somehow innately worse players than men.
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This is because there is another person, a male or female opponent, sat across from the player.
In columns (3) and (4), we add a control for the gender of the opponent in game g. Results
here suggest that it is not that players under or over-perform according to their own gender,
but that it is the gender composition of the game what matters. Female players can expect to
earn about 0.035 fewer points when they face a male opponent, even after controlling for the
differences in their abilities via the Elo differential (E[pig]). Because of this, we next dwelve
deeper in the study of the relationship between gender composition of games and performance.
gender composition and performance
In the analysis that follows, we explore the importance of the gender composition of games on
the performance gender gap. To do so we exploit the panel dimension of our data and rely on
within player i variation in the gender of the opponent. As players sometimes play a man and
sometimes play a women, the opponent’s gender might be conceived of as a ‘treatment’ which
is applied in some games and not in others, the effect of which we want to study.
Any claim we make to the identification of the effect of this ‘treatment’ rests largely on the
gender composition of a game being random, i.e. the genders of the player and the opponent
being independent of one another. The advantage of laboratory experiments like Maas et al.
(2008) is that they can explicitly randomize the gender composition of games. Because we study
real competitions, we cannot randomly assign the gender composition of games, but we can still
check whether the assignment is random or at least conditionally so.
The proportion of opponents who are female in our sub-sample of switchers is 0.22. The
probability that a female player faces a female opponent is 0.61, much higher than the probability
that a male player faces a female opponent (0.12). If the gender of the opponent were truly
random, we would expect these values to match the proportion of opponents that are female.
The fact that they do not indicates that the assignment of the opponent’s gender, and thus the
gender composition of the game, is not random.
The randomness of the gender composition of games is compromised by the presence of
women-only events such as the Women’s World Chess Championship,15 and female-only sub-
events taking place at larger mixed gender events. Female players can thus select out of playing
15 While there are some tournaments that include only men by chance, there are no tournaments which exclude
women as a matter of policy.
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male opponents. Moreover, many tournaments have some form of seeding or tiers so that players
of similar abilities end up playing each other. Given that men have higher average Elo ratings,
this seeding system can further contribute to the correlation between the gender of the player
and that of the opponent. The correlation between the Elo rating of the player and that of the
opponent in our data is 0.449.
On the other hand, there is a random component in the assignment of players to games
as the vast majority of tournaments employ a round robin format, with the players in the
tournament playing one another once. Hence, players have virtually no control over who they
end up playing with.16 Given this random component in the assignment of players, the genders
of the player and the opponent can be conditionally independent after controlling for both the
gender composition of events and the mean Elo rating of players in the game.17
To test the conditional independence of the players’ genders we regress the opponent’s gender,
a dummy equal to one if the opponent is male, on the player’s gender, a dummy equal to one if the
player is male, via OLS on pooled data. If the coefficient on the player’s gender is not different
from zero, it indicates that the genders of the player and the opponent are (conditionally)
independent and that the gender composition of games is random. Results are presented in
Table 3.
In column (1), the point estimate is 0.56 (95 percent CI: 0.537 to 0.588) indicating that a
male player is 56 percentage points more likely to face a male opponent than a female opponent.
In column (2), we re-estimate the model using the sample of ‘switchers’, i.e. only those players
who play both men and women in our sample. For this sub-sample, the coefficient on the player
being male falls to 0.49 (95 percent CI: 0.457 to 0.513). However, when we introduce the share of
other players (excluding the player and opponent in game g) at the event who are female (column
(3)) to capture the effect of women’s tournaments and women only competitions taking place
within larger tournaments, the coefficient on the player being male falls to 0.02 (95 percent CI:
-0.000 to 0.041). In column (4), we include the mean Elo rating of the player and the opponent
in game g (Elog) to account for the fact that male players tend to have higher Elo ratings and
players tend to play against opponents of similar ability. The point estimate of the coefficient on
16 As chess tournaments often have a fairly large number of competitors, these round robin tournaments are
generally of the Swiss-system variety where players play a pre-determined number of rounds, but fewer than a
true round robin tournament.
17 Given three variables x, y and z, the independence of x and y conditional on z requires that the conditional
distribution of x given y and z, p(x|y, z) does not depend on the value of y, so that p(x|y, z) = p(x|z).
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the player being male is effectively zero (95 percent CI: -0.020 to 0.020). In the last row of Table
3, we show the correlation and partial correlation coefficients which tell the same story. Namely,
that once we condition on the mean Elo rating of the game and the gender composition of the
event at which the game is played, there is no evidence of a relationship between the gender
of the player and that of the opponent. We take this as evidence that, for the sub-sample of
switchers, the ‘treatment’ in the form of the opponent’s gender is conditionally independent of
the player’s own gender and that the gender composition of games is conditionally random.
We next exploit this conditional randomness to estimate the effect of the opponent’s gender
on a player’s performance. To do so we estimate the following model:
pointsig = αi + βm
o
ig + θXig + eig, (4)
where pointsig is the points earned by the player i in game g, moig equals one if i
′s opponent is
male and zero if female, β, our parameter of interest, is the effect of the opponent’s gender on
the outcome of the game in terms of the points earned by the player, X is a vector of controls
detailed below, αi is a player i fixed effect capturing time invariant individual characteristics
such as innate ability and preferences for an opponent’s gender that may be correlated with Xig
and/or moig, and eig is a random error term with mean zero that is assumed to be uncorrelated
with Xig and moig, though we return to this issue below.
We estimate equation (4) using OLS on within-i mean differenced data to eliminate αi. Our
main results are presented in Table 4.
In column (1), we regress pointsig on moig only. The coefficient of -0.10 (95 percent CI: -0.12
to -0.09) indicates that the player earns on average 0.1 percent fewer points when the opponent
is male. In column (2), we add the control vector X: the ages of the player and the opponent,
the player’s expected points as calculated in equation (2), dummies for the opponent’s affiliated
national chess federation, the color being played by the player, the mean Elo of the player and
the opponent, and the share of other players at the event who are female. The point estimate
of βˆ falls in absolute value to -0.04 (95 percent CI: -0.053 to -0.027). In column (3), we estimate
the model using the restricted sample in which the player plays both genders at least once
(‘switchers’). As discussed above, it is for this sub-sample that the gender composition of the
game is conditionally random. The estimated βˆ remains -0.04 (95 percent CI: -0.054 to -0.027).
We then allow the effect of the opponent’s gender to differ for male and female players since
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so far we have been mixing two types of games in the reference category: male player vs female
opponent and female player vs female opponent. To address this, we split the sample according
to players’ gender and re-estimate equation (4). In column (4), we estimate the model using
only female players who have played both men and women in our sample. The magnitude of the
point estimate maintains (95 percent CI: -0.080 to -0.007), i.e. female players earn fewer points
against male opponents. We estimate the model for only male players who have played both
men and women in column (5) and find a very similar result (95 percent CI: -0.057 to -0.028).
A t-test of the equality of the βˆ coefficients in columns (4) and (5) returns a p-value of 0.961.18
We thus find no evidence that the effect of the opponent’s gender differs with the gender of the
player.
These results indicate that players earn, on average and ceteris paribus, about 0.04 fewer
points when playing against a man as compared to when their opponent is a woman. Or
conversely, men earn 0.04 points more when facing a female opponent than when facing a male
opponent. This is a sizable effect, comparable to women playing with a 30 Elo point handicap
when facing male opponents. Such an effect indicates some change in behaviour when people
engage in inter-gender competition. What we cannot say from simply looking at the effect of
inter-gender competition on outcomes is whether it is the behaviour of men, women or both
which changes. We study this below, but first we test the robustness of our main results from
Table 4.
Supplementary analysis
In this section, we carry out supplementary analyses to test the credibility of the identifica-
tion strategy and the results above. First, we test the robustness of the primary results to
mis-specification. Second, we consider a particular mis-specification in the form of a possibly
unaccounted for non-linearity in the relationship between the outcome of the game and the Elo
differential, as controlled for by E[pig]. Such a non-linearity might in turn be correlated with
the gender of the opponent and thus bias our results. Third, we consider the bias arising from
the measurement error in Elo ratings that a genuine gender effect, i.e. β #= 0, would introduce.
18 We estimated a fully interacted version of equation (4). This p-value is from the t-test of the coefficient on the
interaction of the player’s and opponent’s genders being equal to zero.
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Robustness to misspecification
To test the robustness of our results to mis-specification we follow the good practice outlined in
Athey and Imbens (2015) and re-estimate equation (4), via OLS using within-i mean differenced
data for different sub-samples. The results are presented in Table 5. In column (1), we estimate
the model excluding any games played in single sex tournaments, either those explicitly women
only, or those accidentally all male or all female. In column (2), we follow Gerdes and Gränsmark
(2010) by estimating the model excluding games that ended in a draw, and in column (3)
we estimate the model using players who play at least 20 games in our sample. In column
(4), we exclude blitz events and junior events. Lastly, in column (5), we replace the gender
composition of the event variable with event fixed effects. In each case, the magnitude and
statistical significance of the effect of the opponent’s gender maintains.
In Table 6, we re-estimate equation (4) for different sub-samples defined by the Elo differential
and the Elo rating of the player. In column (1), we include only games where the Elo differential
between the player and the opponent is less than or equal to 200 Elo points; in column (2) we
use only games where the Elo differential is less than or equal to 100 Elo points; and in column
(3) less than or equal to 50 Elo points. In column (4), we exclude games played by players with
Elo ratings less than 2200, and in column (5) we exclude those with Elo ratings less than 2400.
Again, in each case, the magnitude and statistical significance of the result maintains.
Non-linearity in the E[pig]-outcome relationship
As discussed above, women have, on average, lower Elo ratings than men, though they also
face opponents with lower average Elo ratings. However, when a female player in our sample
plays a male opponent, she faces an average disadvantage of 27 Elo points as opposed to a
mean advantage of 23 Elo points when she faces a female opponent. The Elo differential is thus
correlated with the gender of the opponent. The correlation between the opponent being male
and the E[pig] is small but significant (ρ = −0.049, p-value< 0.000). We control for the Elo
differential via E[pig] and for the mean Elo of the game with Elog. Still, we may be neglecting
some non-linearity in the effect of the Elo differential or of Elog on the outcome of games. We
test the robustness of our results to more general specifications of the Elo ratings and the Elo
differential using switchers only, and present the results in Table 7.
In column (1), we replace E[pig] and Elog in equation (4) with the logged Elo ratings of
18
the player and the opponent. In column (2), we replace E[pig] and Elog in equation (4) with
dummies for decile groups of Elog and E[pig]. In column (3), we add the squares an cubes of
Elog and E[pig] to equation (4). In column (4), we include the interactions of the player and
the opponent’s logged Elo ratings with the decile groups of Elog and E[pig], allowing the effect
of Elo ratings to vary depending on the relative (dis)advantage of the player and the average
ability of the player and opponent in the game. In column (5), we add a dummy equal to one
if the player is at an Elo point disadvantage and zero otherwise to our baseline specification.
It is encouraging that the estimated gender effect of the opponent being male remains
markedly stable in both magnitude and precision as the specification of the effect of Elo ratings
becomes increasingly flexible.
Measurement error bias
Next, we address the issue of a potential measurement error in Elo ratings resulting from the
effect of the opponent’s gender which may bias the estimator of β. Under the null hypothesis that
β = 0, the Elo rating is a reliable measure of players ability. However, under the alternative
that β #= 0, Elo ratings would systematically measure with error the ability of any player
who plays members of the opposite sex, given that women (men) under- (over)-perform when
playing against men (women). That is, if the gender of the opponent matters, Elo ratings
would systematically mis-measure the true ability of players compared to the case where the
gender effect is absent or where players are unaware of the gender of their opponent.19 In
particular, if women perform worse against men, even after controlling for Elo differentials,
women’s Elo ratings would systematically under-rate their true ability whereas men’s Elo ratings
would systematically over-rate their ability. Players’ Elo ratings would then tend to be ‘too big’
for men and ‘too small’ for women. This measurement error in the opponent’s Elo rating would
therefore be correlated with moig and would bias the OLS estimator of β. It is important to keep
in mind that this measurement error, and thus the resulting bias, would be present if and only
if β #= 0. Therefore, this measurement error cannot be responsible for the significance of our
result but it may lead us to underestimate its magnitude.
To see this formally, consider a simplified version of our model
19 This mis-measurement would also affect players who only play opponents of their own gender but whose
opponents’ opponents have been of the opposite sex and so on.
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pointsig = βm
o
ig + θx
o
ig + ηig, (5)
where pointsig is the points earned by player i, xoig is the measured Elo of the opponent, m
o
ig is
the dummy equal to one if the opponent is male and ηig is an error term uncorrelated with xig
or moig. Our problem is that x
o will be measured with error such that xo = xo∗ + w where xo∗
is the true Elo rating of the opponent and w is positively correlated with moig if β #= 0.
To derive the bias in our estimator of β we first regress moig on x
o
ig and obtain the residuals,
ι. We then regress pointsig on xoig and obtain the residuals, τ . Finally, we regress τ on ι to
obtain
βˆ = (m′Pm)
−1
(m′Py) , (6)
where P = I−x (x′x)−1 x′ is the symmetric idempotent matrix with Px = 0. Restating equation
(6) gives
βˆ = (m′Pm)
−1
(m′P (βm+ θx+ η − θw))
= β + (m′Pm)
−1
m′P (η − θw) .
(7)
Taking expectation throughout yields
E
(
βˆ
)
= β + E
[
(m′Pm)
−1
m′Pη
]
− θE
[
(m′Pm)
−1
m′Pw
]
. (8)
The second term in equation (8) equals zero as E [ηm] = 0 by assumption. The third term
depends on the covariance of m and w, which is positive, and on θ, which is negative (the points
i can expect to earn in a game decrease with the Elo of the opponent). Therefore, the bias in βˆ
is positive, i.e. towards 0. This means that our estimates of β in Table 4 can be interpreted as
lower bounds (in absolute value) of the true effect of the opponent’s gender on i’s performance.
That is, the true gender effect may be larger than what we find.
The key result here is that the bias cannot drive our finding that performance is diminished
by playing against a male opponent since i) the bias is only present if there is indeed a gender
effect; and ii) the bias is towards zero, meaning that we are underestimating, in absolute value,
the true gender effect.
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5 Why do women underperform against men in chess?
So far we have established that players fare worse when their opponent is male. However, we
cannot say whether this is due to changes in men’s behaviour, women’s behaviour or both.
Moreover, the mechanism through which this effect operates still remains unclear. In this
section, we first discuss three popular explanations for the underperformance of women in chess
and argue that they fail to account for the observed effect. We then explore three mechanisms
consistent with the observed gender effect: variation in the quality of play, variation in the
competitiveness of players, and variation in the response to competitive pressure.
Innate ability, practice and strategy
One of the most popular explanations for the gender gap in the performance of expert players
refers to innate gender differences in cognitive abilities key in chess. As the opening quotes
demonstrate, the perception that men are superior players persists. This view is best exemplified
by Howard (2004), who uses the substantial and persistent gender differences in Elo ratings to
conclude that men are inherently superior to women in this domain. However, there is no
compelling evidence that either men or women are better suited to excel at chess. Some have
contended that men’s better performance on spatial rotation tasks provides them an advantage
(Li, 2014). Other evidence suggests that recognizing positions on chess boards is more akin to
recognizing faces (Boggan, Bartlett and Krawczyk, 2012), a task at which women outperform
men (Herlitz and Lovén, 2013). A key piece of evidence in this debate comes from Bilalic et
al. (2009) who show that the observed superiority of men in chess, as measured by the average
Elo rating of men versus women, is almost entirely due to the characteristics of extreme value
distributions. Once sampling is taken into account, there is virtually no gender difference in
mean Elo ratings. But even if in spite of the evidence, one were to believe men to be innately
superior chess players, that would not explain why women perform worse when playing against
a man, all else, including Elo, being equal.
Another potential explanation for the observed gender effect could be differences in deliberate
practice and dedication. Chess expertise requires intense, almost obsessive, training and constant
practice and study, which can in turn interfere with child-rearing. Leaving aside the hours of
coaching they receive, top chess players accumulate on average 5,000 hours of study alone by
the tenth year of their career. This figure is comparable to the level of deliberate practice
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accumulated by symphony-level musicians (Charnes and Gerchak, 1996). De Bruin, Smits,
Rikers and Schmidt (2008) find that differences in Elo ratings are partially explained by gender
differences in the time devoted to deliberate practice (though they fail to account for the sampling
issue raised in Bilalic et al. (2009)). However, they also find that gender differences in ratings
remain significant after controlling for the amount of deliberate practice. Therefore, differentials
in practice and study cannot account either for the gender performance gap between equally
skilled male and female players. And again, even if men were more dedicated chess players, that
would not explain why women perform worse against men, all else, including Elo, being equal.
A final possibility is that mixed-gender games may result in players making different strategic
choices, which result in worse outcomes for women. As discussed above, this possibility is
considered in Gerdes and Gränsmark (2010) and Maas et al. (2008). Gerdes and Gränsmark
(2010) find that men choose more ‘aggressive’ opening strategies when playing against women.
They find, however, that these more ‘aggressive’ strategies actually reduce the odds of men
winning and thus cannot explain the performance gender-gap we observe. Shahade (2005)
suggests that the style of play of women in the Elo range of 2300-2500 is commonly viewed
as excessively aggressive and impatient. Maas et al. (2008) find however that women are less
likely to declare aggressive ‘intent’ at the start of games played against a man. They also find,
in contrast to Gerdes and Gränsmark (2010), that men’s declared aggressiveness is not affected
by the gender of the opponent. Unfortunately, Maas et al. (2008) do not relate the declared
aggressiveness of players to outcomes nor use Elo ratings to control for the ability of players.
In summary, the current evidence only considers strategic variations in a single dimension,
‘aggressiveness,’ as determined by the subjective interpretation of play style. Ultimately, this
approach fails to explain our results. For these reasons, we depart from the approach of studying
play style and instead focus on the more objectively measurable quality of play. We use the
measure of within game play quality presented above to examine whether the gender of one’s
opponent affects how well a player is able to play.
The effect of inter-gender competition on Quality of play
Although we have already discussed our quality of play measure in detail, let us reiterate that
the key element of the metric is that, unlike the Elo rating, it is not a measure of a player’s
overall ability or skill. Rather, it captures how well a particular game was played based on the
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analysis of individual moves. This allows us to determine how one’s capacity to play chess, not
just the observed outcomes, varies with the gender of one’s opponent.
While we find that women make larger errors on average than men (see Table 1), we do not
find evidence that women make larger errors than men of equivalent Elo rating. We find that
there is no difference between the mean error (errorg) of a female-female game and that of a
male-male game once we condition on the mean Elo rating of the game (Elog).20 Moreover, the
Elo elasticity of errors is the same for male and female players indicating that the relationship
between ability and quality of play is not gender specific.21 Our conjecture is that the gender
difference in errors is driven by the gender composition of the game, all else being equal.
To test the impact of gender composition on the quality of play, we estimate the following
model
ln (errorig) = δi + γm
o
ig + θXig + uig, (9)
where the dependent variable is the logged mean error committed by the player in game g and
uig is a random error term. The model is estimated via OLS on within-i mean differenced
data to eliminate δi using the same set of controls as in equation (4). Results are presented in
Table 8. In columns (1) and (2), we report the results for female players (full and switchers
samples, respectively) and for male players in columns (3) and (4) (full and switchers samples,
respectively).
We find that the mean error committed by a female player between moves 15 and 30 increases
by about eight percent when facing a male opponent (95 percent CI: 0.006 to 0.168 in column
(1) and -0.000 to 0.168 in column (2)). This indicates that female players are playing worse, on
average and ceteris paribus, when their opponent is male. We do not find evidence that the
quality of a male player’s play is affected by the gender of the opponent. Columns (3) and (4)
show point estimates very close to zero. We test the equality of the effect of the opponent’s
20 We regress errorg on Elog and dummies for male-male games and for female-female games (the base group being
inter-gender games) and then test the equivalence of the estimated coefficients on those dummies obtaining a
p−value of 0.642. Thus we do not reject the null that errorg is equal in male-male and female-female games
when we condition on Elog .
21 We regress the logged mean error of the player on the log of the player’s Elo rating and controls for the logged
Elo rating as well as all the controls on our main regression all interacted with the gender of the player. We
estimate this model via OLS on within-i mean differenced data. The p−value of the estimated coefficient on
the interaction of the player’s gender and the player’s logged Elo rating is 0.580. Thus we do not reject the
null that the Elo rating elasticity of errors is the same for male and female players.
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gender on the quality of play of male and female players. Results suggest that the effect does
differ for male and female players (p-value=0.026 for the switchers sample).22
The quality of play does explain some of the observed gender effect in Table 4. When we
include the log error of the player and re-estimate equation (4) using the sample of female
switchers (equivalent to column (3) of Table 4) we find the size of the estimate (βˆ=-0.032,
95 percent CI: -0.044 to -0.019) somewhat reduced relative to the baseline. This reduction is
statistically significant (p-value=0.006). We subject the analysis of play quality to the same
robustness checks as our primary analysis and report results of these checks in Appendix B
where we find strong support for our result here: female player’s quality of play is reduced by
about eigth percent when facing a male opponent, and a male player’s quality of play is not
affected by the gender of the opponent.
Stereotype threat
Let us now consider three mechanisms which could explain the effect of male opponents on
female’s quality of play.
The first one is stereotype threat, which occurs when individuals perform worse in a task
in fear of confirming a negative stereotype applying to the group they belong to (Steele, 1997).
The anxiety, self-doubt and negative feelings that belonging to a stigmatized group generates
undermine performance, thus confirming the negative stereotype. Salience of negative stereo-
types has been shown to lead to higher heart-rate variability paired with poorer performance in
tests (Croizet, Després, Gauzins, Huguet et al., 2004), and to higher activation of brain areas
related to emotions (Krendl, Richeson, Welley and Heatherton, 2008). Stereotype threat is thus
a natural candidate to explain the observed gender effect on play quality.
Negative stereotypes about female players are very prevalent and salient in chess, as the
opening quotations demonstrate. According to stereotype threat theory, these negative stereo-
types may disrupt the cognitive capacity of females playing against males, thus reducing their
quality of play. Chess requires computational effort to determine the optimal move at each stage
of the game. Given a level of innate ability, better outcomes require deeper computation which
22 We estimated a fully interacted version of equation (9). This p-value is from the t-test of the coefficient on the
interaction of the player’s and opponent’s genders being equal to zero.
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in turn requires greater mental effort.23 As such, any disruption in the ability to commit mental
resources to the computation of the best move can manifest itself in lower quality of play.
Stereotype threat has been shown to impair a cognitive resource key in chess: working
memory. Working memory is defined as the ability to focus the attention on a task and to
store task relevant information temporarily, whilst inhibiting task-irrelevant information and
thoughts. Robbins, Anderson, Barker, Bradley et al. (1996) introduced secondary tasks aimed
at interfering with working memory and found a detrimental effect on chess performance. This
suggests that if female players feel stereotype threat when competing against a male player,
stress, excessive self-monitoring and the need to suppress negative thoughts and regulate anxiety
might tax their working memory and harm their performance in the game. This should naturally
be reflected in our quality of play measure, as Table 8 shows.24
The quality of play metric allows us a deeper insight. In particular, it allows us to establish
whether the gender effect described in Table 4 is consistent with stereotype threat, that is,
women playing worse when they play men, or with stereotype boost (or lift), i.e. men playing
better when they play women (Walton and Cohen, 2003).25 Results in Table 8 are consistent
with stereotype threat but not with stereotype boost.
We cannot however, take the results in Table 8 as conclusive evidence of stereotype threat at
work. The evidence provided here is consistent with the impairment of cognitive abilities that
stereotype threat theory predicts in negatively stereotyped groups, females in the case of chess.
Competitiveness
The second explanation for the reduction in females’ quality of play we observe is a decrease in
the effort or willingness to compete of female players when facing a male opponent. This may
arise from under-confidence (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011) or from distaste for competition,
23 Dr. Emanuel Lasker, a German chess player, mathematician, and philosopher who was World Chess Champion
for 27 years is quoted as saying ‘When you see a good move wait - look for a better one.’.
24 Another channel by which stereotype threat can reduce chess performance is through a disruption of spatial
abilities. Wraga, Helt, Jacobs and Sullivan, (2006) used fMRI to show that stereotype threatened females
perform worse in a mental rotation task, and that this poorer performance is due to a higher activation in
brain regions associated with emotional loads. These results might be relevant for chess because it is a visually-
demanding activity. Players should keep track of the positions of a great number of pieces and need to learn
a large number of piece combinations.
25 Several studies show that performance can increase among the positively stereotyped group at the same time
as performance decreases for the negatively stereotyped group (Wraga et al., 2006).
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especially against males (Croson and Gneezy, 2009).26 Reduction of effort is consistent with
the lower quality of play that female players exhibit when playing against males. Although we
do not observe effort directly, it is possible to study competitiveness indirectly by looking at
resignations and the length of games.
The vast majority of losses in expert chess are due to resignations, where a player concedes
defeat before technically losing, with only 1.2 percent of games in our sample being played
through to checkmate. These resignations could be interpreted as a reluctance to engage in
further competitive effort once the player considers that the expected outcome of the game is
not good enough to warrant the required effort to continue playing. When deciding whether to
resign or not, players perform a cost-benefit analysis. Continuing the game at a given board
position has the cost of the additional effort exerted and the benefit of the additional expected
points earned. If females are under-confident or have a distaste for playing men, we would
expect them to resign more quickly, i.e. in fewer moves, when playing against a male opponent,
all else being equal.
Our interest then is whether the gender of the opponent plays a role in determining the length
of a game. The average game in our sample lasts 43 moves. In average, the longest games are
female-female games with an average number of moves of 45.9. Male-male games are shorter,
only 42.6 moves on average. Mixed gender games fall in between at 43.3 moves per game on
average. To formally test these differences we identify those games in which player i resigns and
we calculate the total number of moves. We then regress the logged number of moves in game
g where the player has resigned on the same set of controls as in equation (4) plus the logged
quality of play of both the player and the opponent (ln (errorig) and ln
(
erroroig
)
). Results are
presented in Table 9. In columns (1) and (2), we report the results for female players (full and
switchers samples, respectively) and for male players in columns (3) and (4) (full and switchers
samples, respectively).
We do not find compelling evidence that the gender of the opponent affects female players’
readiness to resign, i.e. no reduction in effort or willingness to compete. The point estimates
in columns (1) and (2) are negative, but the confidence intervals are too wide for meaningful
inference (95 percent CI: -0.114 to 0.037 in column (1) and -0.112 to 0.045 in column (2)). The
26 Using survey data, Kleinjans (2009) finds that, controlling for ability and family background, the median female
expresses greater distaste for competition than the median male. Female’s stronger distaste for competition
lowers their educational attainment relative to that of male.
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evidence suggests that men, however, resign in about eight percent fewer moves against a male
opponent (95 percent CI: -0.115 to -0.032 in column (3) and -0.122 to -0.038 in column (4)),
though we cannot reject the equality of this effect for male and female players (p-value=0.297).27
Men resign in fewer moves against other men. This suggests additional explanation for the
observed gender effect: an extra willingness of men to compete against women.
One possibility is that men know that women are more error prone when playing male
opponents. As a result, males may play longer against a female opponent, holding out for the
woman to make a larger error than a male opponent would. Were this the case, however, we
should also expect that women, knowing that they make larger errors against men, resign more
quickly against a male opponent. But we find no evidence of this.
An alternative explanation might be that the increased competitiveness of men stems from a
psychological cost to men of losing to a woman. In the case of chess, anecdotal evidence suggests
that such cost may be very real.28 If that is the case, given two identical board positions, and two
opponents of the same ability and who are playing equally well, a male player will be more likely
to continue playing against a female opponent than against a male opponent.29 By persisting
longer in a disadvantaged situation, i.e. ‘dragging it out’, a male player facing a female opponent
maintains a non-zero probability of forcing a draw or even winning the game thus earning, on
average, more points against a female opponent than he would against a male opponent all else
equal. This, of course, means that female players in these games earn, on average, fewer points
as a result.
The two mechanisms described above suggest that the gender composition of a competition
affects the behavior of both male and female competitors. Women tend to play worse when
facing a male opponent, all else being equal. Men are less willing to yield when facing a fe-
27 We estimated a fully interacted version of the model. The p-value reported here is from the t-test of the
coefficient on the interaction of the player’s and opponent’s genders being equal to zero.
28 American essayist Charles Dudley Warner famously quoted that ‘There is nothing that disgusts a man like
getting beaten at chess by a woman.’. Much more recently, in the thread ‘Do men dislike losing to women, if
so why?’ in the Chess.com forum, a user writes: ‘I’ve found male players will drag it out to the last minute,
even when it’s clear they should resign, or are in check or about to be mated, they will still wait one day or
three days before moving, why is this, it’s so annoying.’.
29 Consider a simple illustration of this mechanism. For a male player, the payoff from resigning to a man is
zero. If the player decides to continue the game, his expected payoff in terms of the outcome of the game is
E[p|posn]− e, where e is the effort of continuing the game, and E[p|posn] ≥ 0 is his expected points given the
board position at move n of the game. A male player will resign against a male opponent if e > E[p|posn].
Now suppose the payoff to the same man of resigning to a woman is −c, where c is a psychological cost of
losing to a woman. A male player will then resign against a female opponent if e − c > E[p|posn]. In other
words, ceteris paribus, the E[p|posn] required for a male player to resign against a woman is lower than the
E[p|posn] required for him to resign against a man.
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male opponent. While the two mechanism are very different, they both serve to diminish the
performance of female competitors.
Do the stakes of the game matter?
Let us next explore a third mechanism explaining the effect of the gender composition of games
on females’ quality of play. This explanation is based on the emerging evidence showing that
gender differences in competitive performance might be due to differential responses to compet-
itive pressure. For example, using data from Grand Slam tennis tournaments, Paserman (2010)
finds that both men and women show a substantial deterioration in performance as points be-
come more important, and that women, not men, increase the ratio of unforced errors to winning
shots as stakes increase. Jurajda and Munich (2011) and Örs et al (2013) study the effect of
stakes on performance in the context of college admissions. Jurajda and Münich (2011) use
data from different university entry exams taken by the same individuals and find that women
underperform men in the access to top universities but not elsewhere. Similarly, Örs et al.
(2013) find that females perform worse than males in the entrance exam for the very selective
HEC Paris despite having performed better in the less competitive Baccalaureat exam.
If, as this literature suggests, the competitive performance of women deteriorates with com-
petitive pressure more than men’s, and the competitive pressure in mix gender games is higher
than in single gender games, the combination of these two effects could be responsible for the
lower quality of play of women when playing against men. We next explore this possibility.
How to measure stakes in chess? Most tournaments have a prize fund from which prizes
are awarded. In some tournaments, there are special prizes for younger or females players.
Variability in monetary stakes is thus large. Given that most tournaments are round robin
rather than elimination competitions, one would need very detailed information on the order in
which a player faces his or her opponents in order to asses accurately the monetary relevance of
each single game; unfortunately, this information is generally not available.
Expert chess games have another type of stakes: the potential gain or loss in Elo rating.
Changes in Elo ratings are important for both economic and psychological reasons. The eco-
nomic reason is that organizers and sponsors of competitions use Elo ratings to chose the field
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of participants.30 Highly-rated players can also demand substantial appearance fees. The psy-
chological importance of ratings has to do with status. The Elo rating provides an absolute
measure of ability that players can use to asses their own quality and to measure themselves
against others. Traditionally, FIDE updated the world ranking of players twice a year. Today,
a number of websites provide rankings updated in real time.31 Many threads in chess forums
contain debates and discussions about various approaches to increasing one’s Elo rating, and on
whether the much prevalent obsession with ratings in expert chess is counterproductive for one’s
game.32 Hence, a player’s expected gain or loss of Elo points is a good proxy for his/her stakes
in a particular game, and it is therefore a relatively good measure of competitive pressure.
We study whether the Elo points at stake in a particular game affect the quality of play. To
calculate the Elo points at stake we follow equation (2) in determining the expected points of
the game where, again, a win is worth one point (not Elo points), a draw worth 0.5 and a loss
worth zero. This does not, however, allow us to directly calculate the expectd Elo points at
stake in the game. The change in the player’s Elo from equation (1) is K [pig − E[pig]], but this
depends on the actual outcome of the game, pig. A player at an Elo disadvantage will gain more
Elo points from winning the game than she will lose from losing the game. The same player
will gain points from a draw, while a player with an Elo advantage will lose points from a draw
with a lower rated player.
Therefore, to calculate the expected Elo points from a game, we need to estimate the proba-
bility distribution over outcomes. The stakes of the game will be based on the expectation that
the player will win (piw), lose (pil) or draw (pid). The estimates of these outcome probabilities
must be empirical rather than analytical, i.e. cannot be based on E[pig].33
We estimate piw, pil and pid non-parametrically using a large dataset of about 1.5 million
30 Elo ratings play an important role in team championships. Many professional and semi-professional players
earn a substantial part of their salaries as players on teams in national leagues and invitations to join such
teams are based largely on Elo rating. The same applies to national teams competing internationally where
only few players (there are two national teams: male and female) are invited.
31 See http://www.2700chess.com/ for one example.
32 See, for instance, ‘Obsessed with ratings’ in Chess.com https://www.chess.com/forum/view/general/obsessed-
with-ratings.
33 The Elo curve described in equation (2) is the way in which FIDE computes the expected points of a player
in a game. Hence, it does not need to coincide with the empirical expectation. If they did, players’ expected
gain/loss from a game would be zero.
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games played between 1900 and 2008.34 We use this larger, secondary data source so that
we can produce highly accurate estimates of piw, pil and pid. We need this because the actual
probability distribution over these outcomes varies with the level of Elo. For example, the
probability of a game played between players in the bottom decile of our Elo distribution ending
in a draw is 0.25, whereas the probability of a game played by players in the top decile ending in a
draw is nearly double, 0.48. To account for this, we construct mean Elo rating
(
Elog
)
percentile
groups and also Elo difference
(
Eloig − Elo
o
ig
)
percentile groups. We then calculate piw, pil and
pid for the intersections of each of these, giving us 1000 estimates of these probabilities over
both mean Elo rating and Elo difference. Using these probabilities we construct a new variable,
stakes, defined as
stakesig = |K(0.5pˆiig,d + pˆiig,w − E[pig])| , (10)
which is the absolute value of the expected Elo points to be earned or lost by player i in
game g and pˆiig,w and pˆiig,d are the estimated probabilities of winning and drawing for the Elo
differential-mean Elo percentile group intersection in which game g is located. This stakes
variable is our measure of the stakes of the game. On average, there are just over two Elo
points at stake, though stakes in inter-gender games are slightly higher (2.2 for males and 2.4
for females) than in single gender games (1.9 for female-female and 1.7 for male-male). Hence,
if as we have conjectured, females’ competitive performance deteriorates more than males’ as
competitive pressure increases, the increased stakes in mix gender games could contribute to
explain the detrimental effect of gender composition on the women’s quality of play.
It is the impact of stakes on the quality of play that we are interested in. To examine this we
include the log of the stakes variable into our model of quality of play in equation (9) and re-
estimate the model via OLS with player i mean differenced data using switchers only. Results
are presented in Table 10. In column (1), we present the result for female players. Larger
stakes do increase the mean error committed by female players, though the effect seems small:
a ten percent increase in the stakes leads to a 0.34 percent increase in the mean error. This is
consistent with results in Paserman (2010). In column (2), we interact log stakes with the gender
of i’s opponent for female players and report the marginal effects of the logged stakes from this
34 These are from a database of PGN files stored at http://www.top-5000.nl/pgn.htm. No FIDE registration
numbers are available in this data set, so we could not carry out the above analysis with it as we cannot
identify the gender of players.
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interaction. While the point estimate of the coefficient on the interaction is positive, indicating
that the effect of the stakes on play quality may be larger when the opponent is male, it is
not statistically significant (p-value=0.292) meaning that we cannot draw a conclusion about
whether the effect of the stakes of the game vary with the gender of the opponent.
The stakes also affect the quality of play of male players (column (3)) with a ten percent
increase in the stakes leading to a 0.3 percent decrease in quality of play. Though the point
estimate for the impact of stakes on play quality is smaller for men than for women, the difference
is not statistically significant (p-value=0.385). In column (4), we again interact the logged stakes
with the gender of the opponent. We do not find statistical evidence that the effect of the stakes
of the game for male players depends on the gender of the opponent (p-value=0.615). These
results suggest that competitive pressure does have a detrimental effect on play quality, though
we are unable to convincingly detect any heterogeneity in that effect over the gender composition
of games.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we study gender differences in competitive performance in a real world setting.
We use data from tens of thousands of chess games played by thousands of expert players. Like
women in high-power jobs, expert female chess players have selected into a male dominated and
highly competitive arena. This sample selection is to our advantage. We study a population
that is less likely to experience gender differences in competitiveness than a randomly selected
sample. Although, as in the laboratory, this may come at the cost of external validity, we
identify gender effects in a real world setting where selection migth mitigate these effects.
We test for the presence of a performance gender-gap, first by looking at the performance
of players by gender. Our results are consistent with previous literature showing that females
perform worse than males of comparable ability in competitive settings. Then we show that this
underperformance is driven by the gender composition of games. Our results show that women
earn about 0.04 fewer points when their opponent is male, even when we control for player fixed
effects, the ages and the skill levels (as measured by the Elo rating) of the players involved.
We then study the mechanism underlying the observed results. In doing this, we choose not
to consider changes in strategic choices. We have doubts about whether it is at all possible to
identify strategic variation in a meaningful way by looking at the early phases of the game. In
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the famous ‘Game of the Century’ played in 1956 between a 13 year-old Bobby Fischer and
Donald Byrne, Fischer shockingly lost his queen early on, a move that was seen as a mistake.
Only later in the game did it become clear that the sacrifice was a brilliant piece of strategy by
Fischer that led almost inexorably to his victory. Systematically codifying and rating moves in
a game with so much variation, and where a player’s strategy may not become clear until much
later, is a formidable task and one we believe cannot be done, at least in the framework of the
current paper.
Instead, we employ a unique measure of within-game quality of play developed in Guid and
Bratko (2006, 2011). Unlike the Elo rating, which is a function of all previous games, this
measure of quality of play compares the moves actually played within the game to the moves a
powerful chess engine would have made in the same position. The distance between these two
moves is a measure of the error committed by the player. Moreover, this measure focuses on
the middle-game where, unlike for openings, creativity and improvisation are key. We study
whether this error is a function of the gender composition of the game. Doing so allows us to
test whether the gender effect is the product of women playing worse when they play against
men or of men playing better when they play against women.
The results show that the mean error committed by women is about eight percent larger
when they play against a male. This is likely to be a conservative estimate of the actual effect.
This suggests that the variation in the quality of play explains some portion of the gender effect
on outcomes. We interpret this result in the light of the stereotype threat literature. The
differential response of errors to the gender of the opponent may operate via a reduction in the
cognitive ability of female players facing male opponents. There is no evidence of stereotype
boost affecting men. We do find, however, that men resign more quickly (after fewer moves)
against other men than they do against women. It seems that men continue playing against
women even when they would resign were they playing against men. This persistence, this
willingness to continue competing against female opponents, is also consistent with the observed
gender effect.
We finally consider the effect of competitive pressure as measured by the Elo points at stake
in the game. This is unlikely to be the only source of variation in competitive pressure affecting
players in a particular tournament, but we do not observe tournament round or prize money at
stake, other potential sources of such pressure. We find evidence that an increase in the degree
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of competitive pressure as measured by the Elo point stakes of the game undermines play quality
of both men and women to a similar degree. Future research might consider whether this effect
might depend on the gender composition of competitions, though we do not find persuasive
evidence for such heterogeneity here.
We believe we have provided compelling evidence of the presence of gender effects on compet-
itiveness in a sample of expert chess players. Our results suggest that the introduction of blind
competitions at high level chess tournaments might be a desirable intervention. Blind auditions
have shown to have a very positive effect on the representation of women in top orchestras
(Goldin and Rouse, 2000). Perhaps more important is the fact that women in our sample have
achieved a level of mastery in chess. If the effects we observe are present for such a selected
sample, it seems reasonable to assume that they will be operating at least as strongly in a more
general population. Further research should look into what approaches might be employed to
mitigate this effect.
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample Switchers
Men Women Men Women
pig 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.51
(0.41) (0.42) (0.40) (0.42)
Players’s age 32.59 25.31 31.37 25.14
(14.57) (9.32) (14.13) (8.56)
Opponents’s age 31.96 27.78 30.56 27.73
(14.67) (12.29) (14.04) (12.14)
Opponent is male 0.94 0.38 0.87 0.39
(0.24) (0.49) (0.33) (0.49)
Player’s Elo 2370.06 2278.99 2409.62 2294.21
(186.35) (147.01) (174.93) (140.81)
Opponent’s Elo 2333.34 2274.46 2347.98 2283.26
(251.11) (206.53) (234.57) (204.19)
Player’s error 16.48 17.71 15.63 17.30
(20.74) (21.73) (19.88) (21.27)
Opponent’s error 17.31 17.70 17.17 17.58
(22.26) (22.23) (22.26) (22.29)
Observations 50221 7715 23064 5695
Notes: The first column refers to the means and standard deviations for the full sample. The second column
refers to the means and standard deviations for the sub-sample of players who play at least two games and play
both men and women in our sample (‘switchers’).
Table 2: Gender and performance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Full sample Switchers Full sample Switchers
Player is female -0.010** -0.010* -0.023*** -0.021***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Opponent is female 0.022*** 0.021***
(0.005) (0.006)
Total effect
Female-Female 0.001 0.001
(0.005) (0.006)
Games 57,936 28,759 57,936 28,759
R2 0.212 0.217 0.213 0.218
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of points earned by i in the game: 1 for a win, 0.5 for a draw and
0 for a loss. The models are estimated by OLS on pooled data. Controls include the Elo differnetial, the ages
of each player and the color i plays with. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are clustered at the player level.
Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following schedule: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
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Table 3: Is the gender of the opponent conditionally independent of the player’s gender?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No controls Switchers +Female share +Elog
Player is male 0.563*** 0.485*** 0.020* 0.000
(0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.010)
Games 57,936 28,759 28,759 28,759
R2 0.313 0.215 0.410 0.425
(Partial) ρ 0.559 0.463 0.247 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the opponent is male. The share of non-i players who are
female at the event is added in column (2). In column (3), we exclude players who only do not play against both
men and women in our sample. In column (4), we use this same sub-sample and add the mean Elo rating of the
player and opponent as a control. The models are estimated by OLS using pooled data. Robust standard errors
(in brackets) are clustered at the player level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following
schedule: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
Table 4: Main results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Univariate Controls Switchers Female players Male players
Opponent is male -0.102*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.043** -0.042***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.019) (0.007)
Games 57,936 57,936 28,759 5,695 23,064
R2 0.004 0.239 0.238 0.229 0.246
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of points earned by i in the game: 1 for a win, 0.5 for a draw
and 0 for a loss. The models are estimated by OLS on within-i mean differenced data. Robust standard errors
(in brackets) are clustered at the player level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following
schedule: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
Table 5: Robustness checks, different sub-samples I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No single sex No draws ≥20 games No Blitz or Event FE
events played Junior
Opponent is male -0.041*** -0.044*** -0.032*** -0.041*** -0.039***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Games 24,331 19,399 18,169 27,770 28,759
R2 0.247 0.299 0.236 0.241 0.263
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of points earned by i in the game: 1 for a win, 0.5 for a draw
and 0 for a loss. The models are estimated by OLS on within-i mean differenced data. Robust standard errors
(in brackets) are clustered at the player level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following
schedule: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
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Table 6: Robustness checks, different sub-samples II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
|Elo dif|≤200 |Elo dif|≤100 |Elo dif|≤50 Elo≥2200 Elo≥2400
Opponent is male -0.033*** -0.052*** -0.057* -0.035*** -0.039***
(0.010) (0.017) (0.030) (0.008) (0.010)
Games 19,534 9,587 4,585 23,795 14,407
R2 0.150 0.079 0.069 0.242 0.235
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of points earned by i in the game: 1 for a win, 0.5 for a draw
and 0 for a loss. The models are estimated by OLS on player within-i differenced data. Robust standard errors
(in brackets) are clustered at the player level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following
schedule: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
Table 7: Non-linearity in the effect of Elo differential
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Elog and E[pig]
Logged Elo Decile Squares, Interacted Intercept
ratings groups cubes shift
Opponent is male -0.045*** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.030*** -0.034***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Games 28,759 28,759 28,759 28,759 28,759
R2 0.228 0.239 0.242 0.247 0.239
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of points earned by i in the game: 1 for a win, 0.5 for a draw
and 0 for a loss. The models are estimated by OLS on within-i mean differenced data. Robust standard errors
(in brackets) are clustered at the player level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following
schedule: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
Table 8: Modeling the within-game quality of play
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men
All Switchers All Switchers
Opponent is male 0.087** 0.084* -0.017 -0.001
(0.041) (0.043) (0.020) (0.020)
Games 7,715 5,695 50,221 23,064
R2 0.022 0.024 0.005 0.008
Notes: The dependent variable is the logged mean error committed by i in between moves 15 and 30 of game g.
The models are estimated by OLS on within-i mean differenced data. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are
clustered at the player level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following schedule: *** 1%,
** 5% and * 10%.
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Table 9: Number of moves until resignation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men
All Switchers All Switchers
j is male -0.054 -0.033 -0.074*** -0.080***
(0.037) (0.040) (0.021) (0.022)
Games 2,229 1,605 12,801 5,274
R2 0.131 0.150 0.060 0.067
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of moves of games ended with resgination. The models are estimated
by OLS on within-i mean differenced data using only games which i lost. Robust standard errors (in brackets)
are clustered at the player level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following schedule: ***
1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
Table 10: Quality of play and stakes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Women Men
Log stakes 0.034*** 0.029***
(0.012) (0.007)
Opponent is male 0.079* 0.071 -0.000 -0.017
(0.043) (0.058) (0.020) (0.027)
Marginal effects
Log stakes| opponent is female 0.030*** 0.035
(0.015) (0.023)
Log stakes| opponent is male 0.042** 0.028***
(0.019) (0.007)
Games 5,695 5,695 23,064 23,064
R2 0.011 0.026 0.030 0.030
Notes: The dependent variable is the logged mean error committed by i in between moves 15 and 30 of game g.
The models are estimated by OLS on within-i mean differenced data. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are
clustered at the player level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following schedule: *** 1%,
** 5% and * 10%.
Appendix A: How chess engines determine ‘best’ moves
For the current paper, we use the Houdini 1.5a x64 program which according to the CCRL
rating has an Elo rating of 3126, several hundred points above the very best human players
in history. This rating is, however, based on games with other computer programs, and the
question whether it is comparable to the ratings of human players is not easy to answer, due to
the lack of matches where humans play against top performing computer matches under standard
chess tournament conditions. There are nevertheless several indicators that top computer chess
programs – including the one we use – are much stronger than any human player. In contrast to
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humans, they: (1) have an enormous computing power, (2) use numerical values as evaluations,
(3) adhere to the same rules all the time, and (4) are not influenced by emotions. Computer
programs therefore have a capability of being more consistent than human observers, and can
deal with incomparably more observations in a limited time. Since 2005, chess programs have
defeated several grandmasters and even former world champions. In 2009, a computer chess
program running on a mobile phone won a strong chess tournament “Copa Mercosur” with a
performance rating of 2898 Elo points. The program searched about 20,000 positions per second,
which is at least an order of magnitude less than the program that we use in this paper.
As mentioned in the main text, we consider 16 moves for each player between moves 15
and 30 of each game. Chess has an estimated state-space complexity of 10 to the power of
46. That is why we limit the search depth of Houdini to 15, meaning the program evaluates
15 moves forward from the move being evaluated. Such limits are necessary given the number
of moves we wished to evaluate and the fact that going one move deeper often means double
the computation required. Recent work in Ferreira (2013) estimates that Houdini 1.5a x64 at a
search depth of 15 plies has an estimated Elo rating of 2563 (a grandmaster level), meaning there
are players in our data who in fact have a higher Elo than the chess engine we use to evaluate
moves. However, as noted by Guid and Bratko (2006), “even if [the computer’s] evaluations are
not always perfect, for our analysis they just need to be sufficiently accurate on average since
small occasional errors cancel out through statistical averaging”. Moreover, as noted earlier, the
machines perform exceptionally well against human players. Nevertheless, we can show that our
results are robust to the exclusion of players with Elo ratings in excess of 2563.
Houdini, as other chess programs, uses search trees to find and choose the best possible
move. The root of the search tree is the player’s current position on the board, nodes are chess
positions, links between nodes represent chess moves, and leaves are the terminal positions of the
tree. Because we limit the extent of computations, the leaves do not represent final positions,
but the positions at the maximum depth of search.
When exploring search trees, Houdini determines the value of a starting point and chooses
the best move. This exploration involves assigning evaluations to individual leaves and nodes
in the constructed trees, employing a depth-first search. An evaluation function is used for this
purpose, but only to assess the value of the leaves, while nodes are assessed on the basis of their
immediate descendants, i.e. the leaves and nodes that their connections lead to.
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Houdini employs the mini −max concept, assuming that whatever is good for one player
must consequently be bad for the other one. The root of a search tree is labeled as MAX, all
nodes to which its connections lead as MIN, and then its descendants again as MAX, and so
on. Evaluations are assigned as follows:
1. Nodes marked as MIN are given the lowest evaluation of their descendants.
2. Nodes marked as MAX are given the highest evaluation of their descendants.
The program thus evaluates, from the bottom up, all nodes in subtrees that are formed directly
from the tree’s root, which results in the final value of the root. This value is the ultimate
assessment of the current position, and the move that leads to the root’s descendant with the
highest evaluation is chosen as the best move.
Appendix B: Supplementary quality of play analysis
Table 11: Supplementary quality of play analysis: Different sub-samples I
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
No single sex No draws ≥20 games No Blitz or Event FE
events played Junior
Female players
Opponent is male 0.075* 0.095* 0.168*** 0.079* 0.095*
(0.045) (0.050) (0.058) (0.043) (0.050)
Games 4349 4022 3828 5542 5695
R2 0.033 0.041 0.028 0.025 0.079
Male players
Opponent is male 0.002 0.028 -0.042 -0.000 0.005
(0.021) (0.025) (0.027) (0.021) (0.021)
Games 19982 15377 14341 22228 23064
R2 0.009 0.016 0.013 0.009 0.043
Notes: The dependent variable is the logged mean error committed by i in between moves 15 and 30 of game g.
The models are estimated by OLS on within-i mean differenced data. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are
clustered at the player level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following schedule: *** 1%,
** 5% and * 10%.
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Table 12: Supplementary quality of play analysis: Different sub-samples II
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
|Elo dif|≤200 |Elo dif|≤100 |Elo dif|≤50 Elo≥2200 Elo≥2400 Elo<2536
Female players
Opponent is male 0.084* 0.084* 0.084* 0.115** 0.181* 0.079*
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.050) (0.093) (0.044)
Games 5695 5695 5695 4158 1396 5475
R2 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.046 0.024
Male players
Opponent is male -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.025 -0.042 0.031
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.031) (0.022)
Games 23064 23064 23064 19637 13011 16869
R2 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.018 0.010
Notes: The dependent variable is the logged mean error committed by i in between moves 15 and 30 of game g.
The models are estimated by OLS on within-i mean differenced data. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are
clustered at the player level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following schedule: *** 1%,
** 5% and * 10%.
Table 13: Supplementary quality of play analysis: Non-linearity in the effect of Elo differential
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Elog and E[pig]
Logged Elo Decile Squares, Interacted Intercept
ratings groups cubes shift
Female players
Opponent is male 0.082* 0.077* 0.066 0.060 0.084*
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Games 5695 5695 5695 5695 5695
R2 0.024 0.028 0.027 0.038 0.024
Male players
Opponent is male 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.007 -0.001
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Games 23064 23064 23064 23064 23064
R2 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.016 0.008
Notes: The dependent variable is the logged mean error committed by i in between moves 15 and 30 of game g.
The models are estimated by OLS on within-i mean differenced data. Robust standard errors (in brackets) are
clustered at the player level. Stars indicate statistical significance according to the following schedule: *** 1%,
** 5% and * 10%.
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